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ABSTRACT
So far, privacy models follow two paradigms. The first paradigm,
termed inferential privacy in this paper, focuses on the risk
due to statistical inference of sensitive information about a
target record from other records in the database. The second
paradigm, known as differential privacy, focuses on the risk
to an individual when included in, versus when not included
in, the database. The contribution of this paper consists of
two parts. The first part presents a critical analysis on dif-
ferential privacy with two results: (i) the differential privacy
mechanism does not provide inferential privacy, (ii) the im-
possibility result about achieving Dalenius’s privacy goal [5]
is based on an adversary simulated by a Turing machine, but
a human adversary may behave differently; consequently, the
practical implication of the impossibility result remains un-
clear. The second part of this work is devoted to a solution
addressing three major drawbacks in previous approaches to
inferential privacy: lack of flexibility for handling variable
sensitivity, poor utility, and vulnerability to auxiliary infor-
mation.
1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a significant interest in the analysis of
data sets whose individual records are too sensitive to ex-
pose directly. Examples include medical records, financial
data, insurance data, web query logs, user rating data for
recommender systems, personal data from social networks,
etc. Data of this kind provide rich information for data anal-
ysis in a variety of important applications, but access to such
data may pose a significant risk to individual privacy, as il-
lustrated in the following example.
Example 1. A hospital maintains an online database for
answering count queries on medical data like the table T in
Table 1. T contains three columns, Gender, Zipcode, and
Disease, where Disease is a sensitive attribute. Suppose that
an adversary tries to infer the disease of an individual Alice,
.
Gender Zipcode Disease
M 54321 Brain Tumor
M 54322 Indigestion
F 61234 Cancer
F 61434 HIV
... ... ...
Table 1: A table T
with the background knowledge that Alice, a female living in
the area with Zipcode 61434, has a record in T . The adversary
issues the following two queries Q1 and Q2:
Q1: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T WHERE Gender=F
AND Zipcode=61434
Q2: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T WHERE Gender=F
AND Zipcode=61434 AND Disease=HIV
Each query returns the number of participants (records)
who match the description in the WHERE clause. Suppose
that the answers for Q1 and Q2 are x and y, respectively. The
adversary then estimates that Alice has HIV with probability
y/x, and if y/x and x are “sufficiently large”, there will be a
privacy breach.
1.1 Inferential vs Differential
In the above example, the adversary infers that the rule
(Gender = F ∧ Zipcode = 61434)→ (Disease = HIV )
holds with the probability y/x and that Alice has HIV with
the probability y/x, assuming that the (diseases of) records
follow some underlying probability distribution. This type of
reasoning, which learns information about one record from
the statistics of other records, is found in many advanced ap-
plications such as recommender systems, prediction models,
viral marketing, social tagging, and social networks. The
same technique could be misused to infer sensitive informa-
tion about an individual like in the above example. According
to the Privacy Act of Canada, publishing the above query an-
swers would breach Alice’s privacy because they disclose Al-
ice’s disease with a high accuracy. In this paper, inferential
privacy refers to the requirement of limiting the statistical
inference of sensitive information about a target record from
other records in the database. See [1] for a list of works in
this field.
One recent breakthrough in the study of privacy preserva-
tion is differential privacy [5][7]. In an “impossibility result”,
the authors of [5][7] showed that it is impossible to achieve
Dalenius’s absolute privacy goal for statistical databases: any-
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thing that can be learned about a respondent from the sta-
tistical database should be learnable without access to the
database. Instead of limiting what can be learnt about one
record from other records, the differential privacy mechanism
hides the presence or absence of a participant in the database,
by producing noisy query answers such that the distribu-
tion of query answers changes very little when the database
differs in any single record. The following definition is from
[4].
Definition 1. A randomized function K gives ε-differential
privacy if for all data sets T and T ′ differing on at most one
record, for all queries Q, and for all outputs x, Pr[K(T,Q) =
x] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[K(T ′, Q) = x].
With a small ε, the presence or absence of an individual
is hidden because T and T ′ are almost equally likely to be
the underlying database that produces the final output of
the query. Some frequently cited claims of the differential
privacy mechanism are that it provides privacy without any
assumptions about the data and that it protects against ar-
bitrary background information. But there is no free lunch in
data privacy, as pointed out by Kifer and Machanavajjhala
recently [14]. Their study shows that assumptions about the
data and the adversaries are required if hiding the evidence
of participation, instead of the presence/absence of records
in the database, is the privacy goal, which they argue should
be a major privacy definition.
1.2 Contributions
The contribution of this paper consists of two parts. In
the first part, we argue that differential privacy is insufficient
because it does not provide inferential privacy. We present
two specific results:
• (Section 2.1) Using a differential inference theorem, we
show that the noisy query answers returned by the dif-
ferential privacy mechanism may derive an inference
probability that is arbitrarily close to the inference prob-
ability obtained from the noise-free query answers. This
study suggests that providing inferential privacy remains
a meaningful research problem, despite the protection
of differential privacy.
• (Section 2.2) While the impossibility result in [5] is
based on an adversary simulated by a Turing machine,
a human adversary may behave differently when evalu-
ating the sensitivity of information. We use the Terry
Gross example, which is a key motivation of differen-
tial privacy, to explain this point. This study suggests
that the practical implication of the impossibility result
remains unclear.
Given that inferential privacy remains relevant, the second
part of this work is devoted to stronger solutions for infer-
ential privacy. Previous approaches suffer from three major
limitations. Firstly, most solutions are unable to handle sen-
sitive values that have skewed distribution and varied sen-
sitivity. For example, with the Occupation attribute in the
Census data (Section 7) having the minimum and maximum
frequency of 0.18% and 7.5%, the maximum `-diversity [19]
that can be provided is 13-diversity because of the eligibility
requirement 1/` ≥ 7.5% [22]. Therefore, it is impossible to
protect the infrequent items at the tail of the distribution or
more sensitive items by a larger `-diversity, say 50-diversity,
which is more than 10 times the prior 0.18%. Secondly, even if
it is possible to achieve such `-diversity, enforcing `-diversity
with a large ` across all sensitive values leads to a large infor-
mation loss. Finally, previous solutions are vulnerable to ad-
ditional auxiliary information [21][13][17]. We address these
issues in three steps.
• (Section 3) To address the first two limitations in the
above, we consider a sensitive attribute with domain
values x1, · · · , xm such that each xi has a different sen-
sitivity, thus, a tolerance f ′i on inference probability.
We consider a bucketization problem in which buckets
of different sizes can be formed to accommodate differ-
ent requirements f ′i . The goal is to find a collection of
buckets for a given set of records so that a notion of
information loss related to bucket size is minimized and
the privacy constraint f ′i of all xi’s is satisfied.
• (Sections 4, 5, and 7)
We present an efficient algorithm for the case of two
distinct bucket sizes (but many buckets) with guaran-
teed optimality, and a heuristic algorithm for the general
case. The empirical study on real life data sets shows
that both solutions are good approximations of opti-
mal solutions in the general case and better deal with
a sensitive attribute of skewed distribution and varied
sensitivity.
• (Section 6) We adapt our solutions to guard against two
previously identified strong attacks, corruption attack
[21] and negative association attack [13][17] (see more
details in Section 6).
1.3 Related Work
Limiting statistical disclosure has been a topic extensively
studied in the field of statistical databases, see [1] for a list of
works. This problem was recently examined in the context of
privacy preserving data publishing and some representative
privacy models include ρ1-ρ2 privacy [9], `-diversity principle
[19], and t-closeness[16]. All of these works assume uniform
sensitivity across all sensitive values. One exception is the
personalized privacy in [23] where a record owner can specify
his/her privacy threshold. Another exception is [18] where
each sensitive value may have a different privacy setting. To
achieve the privacy goal, these works require a taxonomy of
domain values to generalize the attributes, thus, cannot be
applied if such taxonomy is not available. The study in [22]
shows that generalized attributes are not useful for count
queries on raw values. Dealing with auxiliary information is
a hard problem in data privacy [21][13][17], and so far there
is little satisfactory solution.
There have been a great deal of works in differential pri-
vacy since the pioneer work [7][5]. This includes, among
others, contingency table releases [2], estimating the degree
distribution of social networks [11], histogram queries [12]
and the number of permissible queries [24]. These works are
concerned with applications of differential privacy in various
scenarios. Unlike previous works, the authors of [14] argue
that hiding the evidence of participation, instead of the pres-
ence/absence of records in the database, should be a major
privacy definition, and this privacy goal cannot be achieved
with making assumptions about the data and the adversaries.
2. ANALYZING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
This section presents a critical analysis on the differential
privacy mechanism. In Section 2.1 we show that the differen-
tial privacy mechanism allows violation of inferential privacy.
In Section 2.2 we argue that a human adversary may behave
differently from some assumptions made in the impossibility
result of [5], thus, the practical implication of the impossibil-
ity result remains unclear.
2.1 On Violating Inferential Privacy
One popularized claim of the differential privacy mecha-
nism is that it protects an individual’s information even if an
attacker knows about all other individuals in the data. We
quote the original discussion from [3] (pp 3):
“If there is information about a row that can be
learned from other rows, this information is not
truly under the control of that row. Even if the
row in question were to sequester itself away in
a high mountaintop cave, information about the
row that can be gained from the analysis of other
rows is still available to an adversary. It is for
this reason that we focus our attention on those
inferences that can be made about rows without
the help of others.”
In other words, the differential privacy framework does not
consider violation to inferential privacy and the reason is that
it is not under the control of the target row. Two points need
clarification. Firstly, a user submits her sensitive data to an
organization because she trusts that the organization will do
everything possible to protect her sensitive information; in-
deed, the data publisher has full control in how to release the
data or query answers in order to protect individual privacy.
Secondly, learning information about one record from other
records could pose a risk to an individual if the learnt infor-
mation is accurate about the individual. This type of learning
assumes that records follow some underlying probability dis-
tribution, which is widely adapted by prediction models in
many real applications. Under this assumption, suppose Q1
and Q2 in Example 1 have the answers x = 100 and y = 99,
even if Alice’s record is removed from the database, it is still
valid to infer that Alice has HIV with a high probability.
Next, we show that even if the differential privacy mecha-
nism adds noises to the answers for queries Q1 and Q2, Alice’s
disease can still be inferred using the noisy answers.
Let x and y be the true answers to Q1 and Q2. We assume
that x and y are non-zero. The differential privacy mecha-
nism will return the noisy answers X = x+ξ1 and Y = y+ξ2
for Q1 and Q2, after adding noises ξ1 and ξ2. Consider the
most used Laplace distribution Lap(b) = 1
2b
exp(−|ξ|/b) for
the noise ξ, where b is the scale factor. The mean E[ξ] is zero
and the variance var[ξ] is 2b2. The next theorem is due to
[5].
Theorem 1. [5] For a count query Q, the mechanism K
that adds independently generated noise ξ with distribution
Lap(1/ε) to the output enjoys ε-differential privacy.
The next theorem shows that Y/X is a good approximation
of y/x.
Theorem 2 (Differential Inference Theorem). Given
two queries Q1 and Q2 as above, let x and y be the true
answers and let X and Y be the answers returned by the
ε-differential privacy mechanism. E[ Y
X
] = y
x
(1 + 2b
2
x2
) and
var[ Y
X
] = 2b
2
x2
(1 + ( y
x
)2), where b = 1/ε.
Proof. Using the Taylor expansion technique [8] [20], the
mean E[ Y
X
] and variance var[ Y
X
] of Y/X can be approximated
as follows:
E[
Y
X
] ' E[Y ]
E[X]
+
cov[X,Y ]
E[X]2
+
var[X]E[Y ]
E[X]3
var[
Y
X
] ' var[Y ]
E[X]2
− 2E[Y ]
E[X]3
cov[X,Y ] +
E[Y ]2
E[X]4
var[X]
E[X] and E[Y ] are equal to the true answers x and y of Q1
and Q2. var[X] and var[Y ] are 2b
2 for Lap(b). cov[X,Y ] =
cov[x+ξ1, y+ξ2] = cov[ξ1, ξ2]. Since ξ1 and ξ2 are unrelated,
cov[ξ1, ξ2] = 0. Simplifying the above equations, we get E[
Y
X
]
and var[ Y
X
] as required.
The next corollary follows from the fact that y
x
≤ 1 and b
is a constant for a given ε-differential privacy mechanism K.
Corollary 1. Let X,Y be defined as in Theorem 2. As
the query size x for Q1 increases, E[
Y
X
] gets arbitrarily close
to y
x
and var[ Y
X
] gets arbitrarily close to zero.
Corollary 1 suggests that Y/X, where Y and X are the
noisy query answers returned by the differential privacy mech-
anism, can be a good estimate of the inference probability
y/x for a large query answer x. For example, for ε = 0.1 and
x = 100, 2b
2
x2
= 0.02, and following Theorem 2, E[ Y
X
] is 1.02
times y
x
; if x = 1000, E[ Y
X
] is 1.0002 times y
x
. If y/x is high,
inferential privacy is violated. Note that var[ Y
X
] is small in
these cases.
2.2 On The Impossibility Results
A key motivation behind differential privacy is the impossi-
bility result about the Dalenius’s privacy goal [5]. Intuitively,
it says that for any privacy mechanism and any distribution
satisfying certain conditions, there is always some particular
piece of auxiliary information, z, so that z alone is useless to
an adversary who tries to win, while z in combination with
access to the data through the privacy mechanism permits
the adversary to win with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
The proof assumes an adversary simulated by a Turing ma-
chine. We argue that a human adversary, who also considers
the “semantics” when evaluating the usefulness of informa-
tion, may behave differently. Let us explain this point by the
Terry Gross example that was originally used to capture the
intuition of the impossibility result in [6].
In the Terry Gross example, the exact height is considered
private, thus, useful to an adversary, whereas the auxiliary
information of being two inches shorter than an unknown av-
erage is considered not private, thus, not useful. Under this
assumption, accessing the statistical database, which returns
the average height, is to blame for disclosing Terry Gross’s
privacy. Mathematically, knowing the exact height is a re-
markable progress from knowing two inches shorter than an
unknown average. However, to a human adversary, the infor-
mation about how an individual deviates from the statistics
already discloses the sensitive information, regardless of what
the statistics is. For example, once knowing that someone
took the HIV check-up ten times more frequently than an
unknown average, his/her privacy is already leaked. Here, a
human adversary is able to interpret“deviation”as a sensitive
notion based on “life experiences”, even though mathemati-
cally deviation does not derive the exact height. It is unclear
whether such a human adversary can be simulated by a Tur-
ing machine.
In practice, a realistic privacy definition does allow dis-
closure of sensitive information in a controlled manner and
there are scenarios where it is possible to protect inferential
privacy while retaining a reasonable level of data utility. For
example, the study in [10] shows that the anonymized data
is useful for training a classifier because the training does not
depend on detailed personal information. Another scenario
is when the utility metric is different from the adversary’s
target. Suppose that the attribute Disease is sensitive and
the response attribute R (to a medicine) is not. Learning the
following rules does not violate privacy
(Disease = x1)→ (R = Positive)
(Disease = x2)→ (R = Positive)
in that a positive response does not indicate a specific dis-
ease with certainty. However, these rules are useful for a
researcher to exclude the diseases x1 and x2 in the absence
of a positive response. Even for a sensitive attribute like
Disease, the varied sensitivity of domain values (such as Flu
and HIV) could be leveraged to retain more utility for less
sensitive values while ensuring strong protection for highly
sensitive items. In the rest of the paper, we present an ap-
proach of leveraging such varied sensitivity to address some
drawbacks in previous approaches to inferential privacy.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section defines the problem we will study. First, we
present our model of adversaries, privacy, and data utility.
3.1 Preliminaries
The database is a microdata table T (QI, SA) with each
record corresponding to a participant. QI is a set of non-
sensitive attributes {A1, · · · , Ad}. SA is a sensitive attribute
and has the domain {x1, · · · , xm}. m is the domain size of
SA, also written |SA|. Each xi is called a sensitive value or
a SA value. oi denotes the number of records for xi in T and
fi denotes the frequency oi/|T |, where |T | is the cardinality
of T . For a record r in T , t[QI] and r[SA] denote the values
of r on QI and SA. Table 3 lists some of the notations used
in this paper.
An adversary wants to infer the SA value of a target indi-
vidual t. The adversary has access to a published version of
T , denoted by T ∗. For each SA value xi, Pr(xi|t, T ∗) denotes
the probability that t is inferred to have xi. For now, we con-
sider an adversary with the following auxiliary information:
a t’s record is contained in T , t’s values on QI, i.e., t[QI],
and the algorithm used to produce T ∗. Additional auxiliary
information will be considered in Section 6.
One approach for limiting Pr(xi|t, T ∗) is bucketization [22].
In this approach, the records in T are grouped into small-size
buckets and each bucket is identified by a unique bucket ID,
Gender Zipcode BID
M 54321 1
M 54322 1
F 61234 2
F 61434 2
... ... ...
BID Disease
1 Brain Tumor
1 Indigestion
2 Cancer
2 HIV
... ...
(a) QIT (b) ST
Table 2: An anonymized table T ∗
T , |T | the raw data and its cardinality
m domain size of SA
xi a sensitive value
oi number of occurrence of xi in T
fi oi/|T |
f ′i privacy threshold for xi
F ′-privacy a collection of f ′i for xi
Bj(Sj , bj) bj buckets of size Sj
s(Bj) total size of buckets in Bj
Table 3: Notations
BID. We use g to refer to both a bucket and the bucket
ID of a bucket, depending on the context. T ∗ is published
in two tables, QIT (QI,BID) and ST (BID, SA). For each
record r in T that is grouped into a bucket g, QIT con-
tains a record (r[QI], g) and ST contains a record (g, r[SA])
(with duplicates preserved). For a target individual t with
t[QI] contained in a bucket g, the probability of inferring a
SA value xi using g, Pr(xi|t, g), is equal to |g, xi|/|g|, where
|g, xi| denotes the number of occurrence of (g, xi) in ST and
|g| denotes the size of g. Pr(xi|t, T ∗) is defined to be the
maximum Pr(xi|t, g) for any bucket g containing t[QI] [22].
Example 2. For the microdata T in Table 1, Gender and
Zipcode are the QI attributes and Disease is SA. Table 2
shows the QIT and ST for one bucketization. To infer the
SA value of Alice with QI = 〈F, 61434〉, the adversary first
locates the bucket that contains 〈F, 61434〉, i.e., BID = 2.
There are two diseases in this bucekt, Cancer and HIV, each
occurring once. So Pr(xi|Alice, 2) = 50%, where xi is either
Cancer or HIV.
3.2 Privacy Specification
We consider the following privacy specification.
Definition 2 (F ′-Privacy). For each SA value xi, f ′i -
privacy specifies the requirement that Pr(xi|t, T ∗) ≤ f ′i , where
f ′i is a real number in the range (0,1]. F
′-privacy is a collec-
tion of f ′i -privacy for all SA values xi.
For example, the publisher may set f ′i = 1 for some xi’s
that are not sensitive at all, set f ′i manually to a small value
for a few highly sensitive values xi, and set f
′
i = min{1, a×
fi + b} for the rest of SA values whose sensitivity grows lin-
early with their frequency, where a and b are constants. Our
approach assumes that f ′i is specified but does not depend on
how f ′i is specified. The next lemma follows easily and the
proof is omitted.
Lemma 1. A bucketization T ∗ satisfying F ′-privacy exists
if and only if f ′i ≥ fi for all xi.
Remark 1. To model a given F ′-privacy specification by
`-diversity [19], the smallest ` required is set by ` = d1/minif ′ie.
If some xi is highly sensitive, i.e., has a small f
′
i , this ` will
be too large for less sensitive xi’s. This leads to poor utility
for two reasons. First, the previous bucketization [22] pro-
duces buckets of the sizes ` or ` + 1. Thus, a large ` leads
to large buckets and a large information loss. Second, a large
` implies that the eligibility requirement [22] for having a `-
diversity T ∗, i.e., 1/` ≥ maxifi, is more difficult to satisfy.
In contrast, the corresponding eligibility requirement for hav-
ing F ′-privacy T ∗ is f ′i ≥ fi for all xi’s (Lemma 1), which
is much easier to satisfy. In Section 3.4, we will address the
large bucket size issue by allowing buckets of different sizes
to be formed to accommodate different requirements f ′i .
3.3 Utility Metrics
Within each bucket g, the QI value of every record is
equally likely associated with the SA value of every record
through the common BID. Therefore, the bucket size |g|
serves as a measure of the “disorder” of such association.
This observation motivates the following notion of informa-
tion loss.
Definition 3. Let T ∗ consist of a set of buckets {g1, · · · , gb}.
The Mean Squared Error (MSE) of T ∗ is defined by
MSE(T ∗) =
∑b
i=1(|gi| − 1)2
|T | − 1 (1)
Any bucketization T ∗ has a MSE in the range [0, |T | − 1].
The raw data T is one extreme where each record itself is
a bucket, so MSE = 0. The single bucket containing all
records is the other extreme where MSE = |T | − 1. With
|T | being fixed, to minimize MSE, we shall minimize the
following loss metric:
Loss(T ∗) =
b∑
i=1
(|gi| − 1)2 (2)
Note that Loss has the additivity property: if T ∗ = T ∗1 ∪T ∗2 ,
then Loss(T ∗) = Loss(T ∗1 ) + Loss(T
∗
2 ).
3.4 Problem Description
To minimize Loss, we consider a general form of bucketi-
zation in which buckets of different sizes can be formed so
that a large bucket size is used for records having a more
sensitive xi (i.e., a small f
′
i) and a small bucket size is used
for records having less sensitive xi (i.e., a larger f
′
i). A col-
lection of buckets can be specified by a bucket setting of the
form 〈B1(S1, b1), · · · , Bq(Sq, bq)〉, where bj is the number of
buckets of the size Sj , j = 1, · · · , q, and S1 < · · · < Sq. We
also denote a bucket setting simply by ∪Bj . s(Bj) = bjSj
denotes the total size of the buckets in Bj . Following Defini-
tion 2, the collection of buckets specified by ∪Bj has the loss∑q
j=1 bj × (Sj − 1)2. We denote this loss by Loss(∪Bj).
A bucket setting ∪Bj is feasible wrt T if ∑j s(Bj) = |T |.
A feasible bucket setting is valid wrt F ′-privacy if there is an
assignment of the records in T to the buckets in ∪Bj such
that no SA value xi has a frequency more than f
′
i in any
bucket g, i.e., Pr(xi|t, g) ≤ f ′i . Such assignment is called a
valid record assignment.
Definition 4 (Optimal multi-size bucket setting).
Given T and F ′-privacy, we want to find a valid bucket setting
〈B1(S1, b1), · · · , Bq(Sq, bq)〉 that has the minimum Loss(∪Bj)
among all valid bucket settings.
This problem must determine the number q of distinct
bucket sizes, each bucket size Sj and the number bj of buck-
ets for the size Sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ q. The following special case is a
building block of our solution.
Definition 5 (Optimal two-size bucket setting).
Given T and F ′-privacy, we want to find a valid two-size
bucket setting 〈B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2)〉 that has the minimum
loss among all valid two-size bucket settings.
Remark 2. The bucket setting problem is challenging for
several reasons. Firstly, allowing varied sensitivity f ′i and
buckets of different sizes Sj introduces the new challenge of
finding the best bucket setting that can fulfil the requirement
f ′i for all xi’s. Even for a given bucket setting, it is non-
trivial to validate whether there is a valid record assignment
to the buckets. Secondly, the number of feasible bucket set-
tings of the form 〈(S1, b1), · · · , (Sq, bq)〉 is huge, rendering it
prohibitive to enumerate all bucket settings. For example,
suppose that S1 and S2 are chosen from the range of [3, 20],
and |T | = 1, 000, 000, there are a total of 2,077,869 feasible
bucket settings of the form (S1, b1) and (S2, b2). This number
will be much larger if q > 2. Finally, the number of distinct
bucket sizes q is unknown in advance and must be searched.
Section 4 presents an algorithm for validating a two-size
bucket setting. Section 5 presents an efficient algorithm for
the optimal two-size bucket setting problem with guaranteed
optimality, and a heuristic algorithm for the multi-size bucket
setting problem.
4. VALIDATING TWO-SIZE BUCKET SET-
TING
Let V alid(B, T, F ′) denote a function that tests if a bucket
setting B is valid. We assume that the number of occurrence
oi for xi in T has been collected, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In Section 4.1, we
consider buckets having the same size and we give an O(m)
time and space algorithm for evaluating V alid(B, T, F ′). In
Section 4.2, we consider buckets having two different sizes and
give an O(m) time and space algorithm for V alid(B, T, F ′).
In both cases, we give a linear time algorithm for finding a
valid record assignment for a valid bucket setting.
4.1 One-Size Bucket Setting
Let B = {g0, · · · , gb−1} be a set of b buckets of the same
size S. To validate this bucket setting, we introduce a round-
robin assignment of records to buckets.
Round-Robin Assignment (RRA): For each value xi,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, we assign the t-th record of xi to the bucket
gs, where s = (o1 + · · · + oi−1 + t) mod b, where oi is the
number of occurrence of xi in T . In other words, the records
for xi are assigned to the buckets in a round-robin manner;
the order in which xi is considered by RRA is not important.
It is easy to see that the number of records for xi assigned to
a bucket is either b|oi|/bc or d|oi|/be. The next lemma gives a
sufficient and necessary condition for V alid(B, T, F ′) = true.
Lemma 2 (Validating one-size bucket setting). Let
B be a set of b buckets of size S such that |T | = s(B). The fol-
lowing are equivalent: (1) V alid(B, T, F ′) = true. (2) There
is a valid RRA from T to B wrt F ′. (3) For each SA value
xi,
doi/be
S
≤ f ′i . (4) For each SA value xi, oi ≤ bf ′iScb.
Proof. We show 4 ⇒ 3 ⇒ 2 ⇒ 1 ⇒ 4. Observe that if
r is a real number and i is an integer, r ≤ i if and only if
dre ≤ i, and i ≤ r if and only if i ≤ brc. Then the following
rewriting holds.
doi/be
S
≤ f ′i ⇔ doi/be ≤ f ′iS ⇔ doi/be ≤ bf ′iSc ⇔ oi/b ≤
bf ′iSc ⇔ oi ≤ bf ′iScb. This shows the equivalence of 4 and 3.
To see 3 ⇒ 2, observe that doi/be
S
is the maximum fre-
quency of xi in a bucket generated by RRA. Condition 3
implies that this assignment is valid. 2 ⇒ 1 follows because
every valid RRA is a valid assignment. To see 1⇒ 4, observe
that F ′-privacy implies that the number of occurrence of xi
in a bucket of size S is at most bf ′iSc. Thus for any valid as-
signment, the total number of occurrence oi in the b buckets
of size S is no more than bf ′iScb.
4.2 Two-Size Bucket Setting
Now we consider a two-size bucket setting of the form
〈B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2)〉. The next lemma follows trivially.
Lemma 3. V alid(B1∪B2, T, F ′) = true if and only if there
is a partition of T , {T1, T2}, such that V alid(B1, T1, F ′) =
true and V alid(B2, T2, F
′) = true.
Definition 6. Given F ′-privacy, for each xi and for j =
1, 2, we define uij = bf ′iSjcbj and aij = min{uij , oi}.
From Lemma 2(4), uij is the upper bound on the number of
records for xi that can be allocated to Bj without violating
f ′i -privacy, assuming unlimited supply of xi records. aij is
the upper bound, assuming the actual supply of xi records,
i.e., oi. The next theorem gives the condition for V alid(B1 ∪
B2, T, F
′) = true.
Theorem 3 (Validating two-size bucket setting).
V alid(B1∪B2, T, F ′) = true if and only if all of the following
conditions hold:
∀i : ai1 + ai2 ≥ oi (Privacy Constraint(PC)) (3)
j = 1, 2 :
∑
i
aij ≥ s(Bj) (Fill Constraint(FC))) (4)
|T | = s(B1) + s(B2) (Capacity Constraint(CC))) (5)
Proof. Intuitively, Equation (3) says that the number of
occurrence of xi does not exceed the upper bound ai1+ai2 im-
posed by F ′-privacy on all buckets collectively, thus, the name
Privacy Constraint. Equation (4) says that under this upper
bound constraint it is possible to fill up the buckets in Bj
without leaving unused slots, thus, the name Fill Constraint.
Equation (5) says that the total bucket capacity matches the
data cardinality, thus the name Capacity Constraint. Clearly,
all these conditions are necessary for a valid assignment. The
sufficiency proof is given by the algorithm in the next subsec-
tion that finds a valid assignment of the records in T to the
buckets in B1 and B2, assuming that the above conditions
hold.
In the rest of the paper, PC, FC, and CC denote Privacy
Constraint, Fill Constraint, and Capacity Constraint in The-
orem 3.
Corollary 2. For a set buckets B with at most two bucket
sizes, V alid(B, T, F ′) = true can be tested in O(m) time and
O(m) space.
4.3 Record Partitioning
Suppose that PC, FC and CC in Theorem 3 hold. We show
how to find a partition {T1, T2} of T such that V alid(B1, T1, F ′) =
true and V alid(B2, T2, F
′) = true. This provides the suffi-
ciency proof for Theorem 3 because Lemma 3 implies V alid(B1∪
B2, T, F
′) = true. By finding the partition {T1, T2}, we also
provide an algorithm for assigning records from T to the
buckets in B1 ∪ B2, that is, simply applying RRA to each
of (Tj , Bj), j = 1, 2.
The partition {T1, T2} can be created as follows. For each
SA value xi, initially T1 contains any ai1 records and T2
contains the remaining oi − ai1 records for xi. Since ai1 ≤
ui1, Lemma 2(4) holds on (T1, B1). (Note that in this case,
oi in Lemma 2 is the number of occurrence of xi in T1.)
PC implies that the number of occurrence of xi in T2, i.e.,
oi − ai1, is no more than ai2, therefore, Lemma 2(4) also
holds on (T2, B2). FC implies |T1| ≥ s(B1). If |T1| = s(B1),
|T2| = s(B2) (i.e., CC), from the above discussion and Lemma
2, V alid(B1, T1, F
′) = true and V alid(B2, T2, F ′) = true.
We are done.
We now assume |T1| > s(B1), thus |T2| < s(B2). We need
to move |T1|−s(B1) records from T1 to T2 without exceeding
the upper bound ai2 for T2. FC implies that such moves are
possible because there must be some xi for which less than
ai2 records are found in T2. For such xi, we move records
of xi from T1 to T2 until the number of records for xi in
T2 reaches ai2 or until |T2| = s(B2), whichever comes first.
Since we move a record for xi to T2 only when there are less
than ai2 records for xi in T2, the condition of Lemma 2(4)
is preserved on (T2, B2). Clearly, moving a record out of T1
always preserves the condition of Lemma 2(4) on (T1, B1).
As long as |T2| < s(B2), the above argument can be repeated
to move more records from T1 to T2.
Eventually, we have |T2| = s(B2), so V alid(B1, T1, F ′) =
true and V alid(B2, T2, F
′) = true. The {T1, T2} is the par-
tition required.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
(a) The bucket for B1
9 10 12 13
9 11 12 14
9 11 13 14
9 11 13 14
9 11 13 14
10 11 13 14
10 12 13 14
10 12 13 14
10 12 13 14
(b) The buckets for B2
Figure 1: The record assignment for Example 3
Example 3. Suppose f ′i = 2× fi + 0.05. Consider a table
T containing 50 records with oi for xi as follows:
x1-x8: oi = 1, fi = 0.02 and f
′
i = 0.09.
x9-x12: oi = 6, fi = 0.12 and f
′
i = 0.29.
x13-x14: oi = 9, fi = 0.18 and f
′
i = 0.41.
Consider the bucket setting B1(S1 = 4, b1 = 9), B2(S2 =
14, b2 = 1). Note CC in Theorem 3 holds. Let us compute
ai1 and ai2.
ai1 = min{ui1, oi}: For x1-x8, ui1 = bf ′iS1cb1 = b0.09 ×
4c × 9 = 0, so ai1 = 0. For x9-x12, ui1 = b0.29× 4c × 9 = 9,
ai1 = 6. For x13-x14, ui1 = b0.41× 4c × 9 = 9, ai1 = 9.
ai2 = min{ui2, oi}: For x1-x8, ui2 = bf ′iS2cb2 = b0.09 ×
14c × 1 = 1, ai2 = 1. For x9-x12, ui2 = b0.29× 14c × 1 = 4,
ai2 = 4. For x13-x14, ui2 = b0.41× 14c × 1 = 5, ai2 = 5.
It can be verified that PC and FC in Theorem 3 hold. To
find the partitioning {T1, T2}, initially T1 contains ai1 = 0
record for each of x1-x8, ai1 = 6 records for each of x9-x12,
and ai1 = 9 records for each of x13-x14. T2 contains the
remaining records in T . Since T1 contains 42 records, but
s(B1) = 36, we need to move 6 records from T1 to T2 without
exceeding the upper bound ai2 for T2. This can be done by
moving one record for each of x9−x14 from T1 to T2. Figure
1 shows a record assignment generated by RRA for (B1, T1)
and (B2, T2).
5. FINDING OPTIMAL BUCKET SETTINGS
We now present an efficient algorithm for finding the opti-
mal bucket setting. Section 5.1 presents an exact solution for
the two-size bucket setting problem. Section 5.2 presents a
heuristic solution for the multi-size bucket setting problem.
5.1 Algorithms for Two-Size Bucket Settings
Given T and F ′-privacy, we want to find the valid bucket
setting of the form 〈B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2)〉, where bj ≥ 0 and
S1 < S2, such that the following loss is minimized
Loss(B1 ∪B2) = b1(S1 − 1)2 + b2(S2 − 1)2 (6)
One approach is applying Theorem 3 to validate each fea-
sible bucket setting (B1, B2), but this is inefficient because
the number of such bucket settings can be huge (Remark 2).
We present a more efficient algorithm that prunes the bucket
settings that are not valid or do not have the minimum loss.
Observe that f ′i -privacy implies that a record for xi must be
placed in a bucket of size at least d1/f ′ie; therefore, the mini-
mum size for S1 and S2 is M = mini{d1/f ′ie}. The maximum
bucket size M ′ for S1 and S2 is constrained by the maximum
loss allowed. We assume that M ′ is given, where M ′ > M .
We consider only (S1, S2) such that M ≤ S1 < S2 ≤ M ′.
Note that a valid bucket setting may not exist in this range
of size.
5.1.1 Indexing Bucket Settings
We first present an “indexing” structure for feasible bucket
settings to allow a direct access to any feasible bucket set-
ting. We say that a pair (b1, b2) is feasible (resp. valid) wrt
(S1, S2) if the bucket setting 〈B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2)〉 is feasi-
ble (resp. valid). A valid pair (b1, b2) is optimal wrt (S1, S2) if
Loss(B1∪B2) is minimum among all valid pairs wrt (S1, S2).
We define Γ(S1, S2) to be the list of all feasible (b1, b2) in the
descending order of b1, thus, in the ascending order of b2. In-
tuitively, an earlier bucket setting has more smaller buckets,
thus, a smaller Loss, than a later bucket setting. Below, we
show that the i-th pair in Γ(S1, S2) can be generated directly
using the position i without scanning the list. We will use
this property to locate all valid pairs by a binary search on
Γ(S1, S2) without storing the list. To this end, it suffices to
identify the first and last pairs in Γ(S1, S2), and the incre-
ments of b1 and b2 between two consecutive pairs.
The first pair in Γ(S1, S2), denoted (b
0
1, b
0
2), has the largest
possible b1 such that S1b1 + S2b2 = |T |. So (b01, b02) is the
solution to the following integer linear program:
min{b2 | S1b1 + S2b2 = |T |} (7)
b1 and b2 are variables of non-negative integers and S1, S2, |T |
are constants.
Next, consider two consecutive pairs (b1, b2) and (b1−∆1, b2+
∆2) in Γ(S1, S2). Since S1b1 + S2b2 = |T | and S1(b1 −∆1) +
S2(b2 + ∆2) = |T |, S1∆1 = S2∆2. Since ∆1 and ∆2 are the
smallest positive integers such that this equality holds, S2∆2
must be the least common multiple of S1 and S2, denoted by
LCM(S1, S2). ∆2 and ∆1 are then given by
∆2 = LCM(S1, S2)/S2, ∆1 = LCM(S1, S2)/S1 (8)
Therefore, the ith pair in Γ(S1, S2) has the form (b
0
1 − i ∗
∆1, b
0
2 + i∗∆2), where i ≥ 0. The last pair has the maximum
i such that 0 ≤ b01 − i ∗∆1 < ∆1, or b01/∆1 − 1 < i ≤ b01/∆1.
The only integer i satisfying this condition is given by
k = bb01/∆1c (9)
Lemma 4. Γ(S1, S2) has the form
(b01, b
0
2), (b
0
1−∆1, b02 +∆2), · · · , (b01−k ∗∆1, b02 +k ∗∆2) (10)
where b01, b
0
2,∆1,∆2, k are defined in Equations (7-9).
Remark 3. Γ(S1, S2) in Lemma 4 has several important
properties for dealing with a large data set. Firstly, we can ac-
cess the i-th element of Γ(S1, S2) without storing or scanning
the list. Secondly, we can represent any sublist of Γ(S1, S2)
by a bounding interval [i, j] where i is the starting position
and j is the ending position of the sublist. Thirdly, the com-
mon sublist of two sublists L and L′ of Γ(S1, S2), denoted by
L ∩ L′, is given by the intersection of the bounding intervals
of L and L′.
Example 4. Let |T | = 28, S1 = 2, S2 = 4. LCM(S1, S2) =
4. ∆2 = 4/4 = 1 and ∆1 = 4/2 = 2. b
0
1 = 14, b
0
2 = 0.
k = b14/2c = 7. Γ(S1, S2) is (14,0), (12,1), (10,2), (8,3),
(6,4), (4,5), (2,6), (0,7).
The length k of Γ(S1, S2), given by Equation (9), is propor-
tional to the cardinality |T |. b01 is as large as |T |/S1 (when
b02 = 0) and ∆1 is no more than S2. Thus k is as large as
|T |/(S1S2). With S1 and S2 being small, k is proportional
to |T |. Therefore, examining all pairs in Γ(S1, S2) is not
scalable. In the rest of this section, we explore two pruning
strategies to prune unpromising pairs (b1, b2) in Γ(S1, S2),
one based on loss minimization and one based on privacy
requirement.
5.1.2 Loss-Based Pruning
Our first strategy is pruning the pairs in Γ(S1, S2) that
do not have the minimum loss wrt (S1, S2), by exploiting
the following monotonicity of Loss, which follows from the
descending order of b1, S1 < S2, and Equation (6).
Lemma 5 (Monotonicity of loss). If (b1, b2) precedes
(b′1, b
′
2) in Γ(S1, S2). Loss(B1 ∪B2) < Loss(B′1 ∪B′2), where
Bj contains bj buckets of size Sj, and B
′
j contains b
′
j buckets
of size Sj, j = 1, 2.
Thus the first valid pair in Γ(S1, S2) is the optimal pair wrt
(S1, S2). Lemma 5 can also be exploited to prune pairs across
different (S1, S2). Let Bestloss be the minimum loss found
so far and (S1, S2) be the next pair of sizes to be considered.
From Lemma 5, all the pairs in Γ(S1, S2) that have a loss less
than Bestloss must form a prefix of Γ(S1, S2). Let (b
∗
1, b
∗
2)
be the cutoff point of this prefix, where b∗1 = b
0
1 − k∗ ∗ ∆1
and b∗2 = b
0
2 + k
∗ ∗∆2. k∗ is the maximum integer satisfying
b∗1(S1 − 1)2 + b∗2(S2 − 1)2 < Bestloss. k∗ is given by
k∗ = max{0, bBestloss − b
0
1(S1 − 1)2 − b02(S2 − 1)2
∆2(S2 − 1)2 −∆1(S1 − 1)2 c} (11)
The next lemma revises Γ(S1, S2) by the cutoff point based
on Bestloss.
Lemma 6 (Loss-based pruning). Let Bestloss be the min-
imum loss found so far and let (S1, S2) be the next pair of
sizes to consider. Let k′ = min{k, k∗}, where k is given by
Equation (9) and k∗ is given by Equation (11). Let Γ′(S1, S2)
denote the prefix of Γ(S1, S2) that contains the first k
′ + 1
pairs. It suffices to consider Γ′(S1, S2).
In the rest of this section, Γ′ denotes Γ′(S1, S2) when S1
and S2 are clear from context.
5.1.3 Privacy-Based Pruning
From Lemma 5, the optimal pair wrt (S1, S2) is the first
valid pair in Γ′. Our second strategy is to locate the first
valid pair in Γ′ directly by exploiting a certain monotonicity
property of the condition for a valid pair. First, we intro-
duce some terminology. Consider any sublist L of Γ′ and any
boolean condition C on a pair. H(C,L) denotes the set of
all pairs in L on which C holds, and F (C,L) denotes the set
of all pairs in L on which C fails. C is monotone in L if
whenever C holds on a pair in L, it holds on all later pairs in
L, and anti-monotone in L if whenever C fails on a pair in
L, it fails on all later pairs in L. A monotone C splits L into
two sublists F (C,L) and H(C,L) in that order, and an anti-
monotone C splits L into two sublists H(C,L) and F (C,L)
in that order. Therefore, if we can show that FC and PC in
Theorem 3 are monotone or anti-monotone, we can locate all
valid pairs in Γ′, i.e., those satisfying both FC and PC, by a
binary search over Γ′. We consider FC and PC separately.
Monotonicity of FC. Let FC(S1) denote FC for j = 1,
and FC(S2) denote FC for j = 2. Note that H(FC,Γ
′) is
given by H(FC(S1),Γ
′) ∩H(FC(S2),Γ′).
Lemma 7 (Monotonicity of FC). FC(S1) is monotone
in Γ′ and FC(S2) is anti-monotone in Γ′.
Proof. We rewrite FC as∑
i
mini{bf ′iS1cb1, oi} ≥ S1b1 (12)∑
i
mini{bf ′iS2cb2, oi} ≥ S2b2 (13)
Assume that (b1, b2) precedes (b
′
1, b
′
2) in Γ
′. Then b1 > b′1
and b2 < b
′
2. As b1 decreases to b
′
1, both bf ′iS1cb1 and S1b1
decreases by a factor by b′1/b1, but oi remains unchanged.
Therefore, if Equation (12) holds for (b1, b2), it holds for
(b′1, b
′
2) as well; so Equation (12) is monotone on Γ
′. For
a similar reason, if Equation (13) fails on (b1, b2), it remains
to fail on (b′1, b
′
2) as well; thus Equation (13) is anti-monotone
on Γ′.
Monotonicity of PC. Let PC(xi) denote PC for xi.
H(PC,Γ′) is given by ∩iH(PC(xi),Γ′). To computeH(PC(xi),Γ′),
we rewrite PC(xi) as
min{bf ′iS1cb1, oi}+min{bf ′iS2cb2, oi} ≥ oi (14)
Since b1 is decreasing and b2 is increasing in Γ
′, bf ′iS1cb1 ≥ oi
is anti-monotone and bf ′iS2cb2 ≥ oi is monotone in Γ′. Note
Equation (14) holds inH(bf ′iS1cb1 ≥ oi,Γ′) andH(bf ′iS2cb2 ≥
oi,Γ
′).
Let us consider the remaining part of Γ′, denoted by Γ′(xi):
F (bf ′iS1cb1 ≥ oi,Γ′) ∩ F (bf ′iS2cb2 ≥ oi,Γ′).
In this part, Equation (14), thus PC(xi), degenerates into
bf ′iS1cb1 + bf ′iS2cb2 ≥ oi (15)
Consider
bf ′iS2c∆2 ≥ bf ′iS1c∆1 (16)
and any two consecutive pairs (b1, b2) and (b1 −∆1, b2 + ∆2)
in Γ′(xi). If Equation (16) holds, Equation (15) holding on
(b1, b2) implies that it holds on (b1−∆1, b2+∆2), thus, Equa-
tion (15) is monotone; if Equation (16) fails, Equation (15)
failing on (b1, b2) implies that it fails on (b1 −∆1, b2 + ∆2),
thus, Equation (15) is anti-monotone. Recall that in Γ′(xi),
PC(xi) degenerates into Equation (15). The next lemma
summarizes the above discussion.
Lemma 8 (Monotonicity of PC). (i) bf ′iS1cb1 ≥ oi
is anti-monotone in Γ′ and bf ′iS2cb2 ≥ oi is monotone in Γ′.
(ii) If Equation (16) holds, PC(xi) is monotone in Γ
′(xi),
and if Equation (16) fails, PC(xi) is anti-monotone in Γ
′(xi).
Corollary 3. H(PC(xi),Γ
′) consists of H(bf ′iS1cb1 ≥
oi,Γ
′), H(PC(xi),Γ′(xi)), and H(bf ′iS2cb2 ≥ oi,Γ′).
5.1.4 Algorithms
The next theorem gives a computation of all pairs in Γ′
satisfying both PC and FC, i.e., all valid pairs in Γ′.
Theorem 4 (Computing all valid pairs in Γ′). Let Γ∗
be the intersection of H(FC(S1),Γ
′), H(FC(S2),Γ′), and
∩iH(PC(xi),Γ′). (i) Γ∗ contains exactly the valid pairs in
Γ′. (ii) The first pair in Γ∗ (if any) is the optimal pair wrt
(S1, S2). (iii) Γ
∗ can be computed in O(m log |T |) time and
O(m) space.
Proof. (i) follows from Theorem 3. From Lemma 5, the
first pair in Γ∗ has the minimum loss wrt (S1, S2). To see (iii),
the monotonicities in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, and Corollary
3, imply that each sublist involved in computing Γ∗ can be
found by a binary search over Γ′, which takes O(m log |T |)
time (note that the length k′ of Γ′ is no more than |T |). Note
that intersecting two sublists takes O(1). The O(m) space
follows from the fact that each sublist is represented by its
bounding interval and any element of Γ′ examined by a binary
search can be generated based on its position without storing
the list.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Two-Size Bucketing
TwoSizeBucketing(T, F ′,M,M ′)
Input: T , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, F ′, M,M ′
Output: the optimal bucket setting 〈(S1, b1), (S2, b2)〉
1: compute oi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
2: Bestloss ←∞
3: Bestsetting ← NULL
4: for all {S1 = M ; S1 ≤M ′ − 1; S1 + +} do
5: for all {S2 = S1 + 1; S2 ≤M ′; S2 + +} do
6: compute Γ∗ using Theorem 4
7: if Γ∗ is not empty then
8: let (b1, b2) be the first pair in Γ
∗
9: let Bj be the set of bj buckets of size Sj , j = 1, 2
10: if Bestloss > Loss(B1 ∪B2) then
11: Bestsetting ← 〈(S1, b1), (S2, b2)〉
12: Bestloss ← Loss(B1 ∪B2)
13: return Bestsetting
Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm for finding the optimal
two-size bucket setting based on Theorem 4, TwoSizeBuck-
eting. The input consists of a table T , a privacy parameter
F ′, and the minimum and maximum bucket sizes M and M ′.
Line 1 computes oi in one scan of T . Lines 2 and 3 initial-
ize Bestloss and Bestsetting. Lines 4 and 5 iterate through
all pairs (S1, S2) with M ≤ S1 < S2 ≤ M ′. For each pair
(S1, S2), Line 6 computes the list Γ
∗ using Theorem 4. Lines
8-12 compute Loss of the first pair in Γ∗ and update Bestloss
and Bestsetting if necessary. Line 13 returns Bestsetting. The
algorithm uses both loss-based pruning and privacy-based
pruning. The former is through the prefix Γ′ obtained by
the upper bound Bestloss as computed in Lemma 6, and the
latter is through the binary search of valid pairs implicit in
the computation of Γ∗. To tighten up Bestloss, Lines 4 and
5 examine smaller sizes (S1, S2) before larger ones.
5.2 Algorithms for Multi-Size Bucket Settings
A natural next step is to extend the solution for the two-
size problem to the multi-size problem. To do so, we must
extend Theorem 3 to validate a three-size bucket setting. The
next example shows that this does not work.
Example 5. Let |B1| = |B2| = 20, |B3| = 30, and |T | =
70. There are 11 values x1, · · · , x11: oi = 5 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10,
and o11 = 20. Suppose that for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, ai1 = ai2 = 0,
ai3 = 5, and a11,1 = a11,2 = a11,3 = 20. The following
extended version of PC, FC and CC in Theorem 3: ∀i : ai1 +
ai2 + ai3 ≥ oi; for j = 1, 2, 3, ∑i aij ≥ |Bj |; |T | = |B1| +|B2|+ |B3|. However, there is no valid record assignment to
these buckets. Note that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, ai1 = ai2 = 0, none
of the records for xi can be assigned to the buckets for B1 or
B2. So the 50 records for xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, must be assigned to
the buckets for B3, but B3 has a capacity of 30.
Our solution is recursively applying TwoSizeBucketing to
reduce Loss. This algorithm, MultiSizeBucketing, is given in
Algorithm 2. The input consists of T , a set of records, B,
a set of buckets of the same size, and F ′,M,M ′ as usual,
where |T | = s(B). The algorithm applies TwoSizeBucket-
ing to find the optimal two-size bucket setting (B1, B2) for
T (Line 1). If Loss(B1 ∪ B2) < Loss(B), Line 3 parti-
tions the records of T into T1 and T2 between B1 and B2.
Algorithm 2 Heuristic Multi-Size Bucketing
MultiSizeBucketing(T,B, F ′,M,M ′)
Input: T , B, F ′,M,M ′
Output: a bucket setting 〈B1, · · · , Bq〉 and T1, · · · , Tq, where
Tj is a set of records for Bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ q
1: 〈B1, B2〉 ← TwoSizeBucketing(T, F ′,M,M ′)
2: if Loss(B1 ∪B2) < Loss(B) then
3: (T1, T2)← RecordPartition(T,B1, B2) (Section 4.3)
4: MultiSizeBucketing(T1, B1, F
′,M,M ′)
5: MultiSizeBucketing(T2, B2, F
′,M,M ′)
6: else
7: return(T,B)
RecordPartition(T,B1, B2) is the record partition procedure
discussed in Section 4.3. Lines 4 and 5 recur on each of
(T1, B1) and (T2, B2). If Loss(B1 ∪ B2) ≥ Loss(B), Line 7
returns the current bucket setting B for T .
6. ADDITIONAL AUXILIARY INFORMATION
Dealing with an adversary armed with additional auxiliary
information is one of the hardest problems in data privacy.
As pointed out by [14], there is no free lunch in data pri-
vacy. Thus, instead of dealing with all types of auxiliary
information, we consider two previously identified attacks,
namely, corruption attack [21] and negative association at-
tack [13][17]. To focus on the main idea, we consider F ′-
privacy such that f ′i is the same for all xi’s. In this case,
F ′-privacy degenerates into `-diversity with ` = d1/f ′ie and
the solution in Section 5.1 returns buckets of size S1 = ` or
S2 = ` + 1, and each record in a bucket has a distinct SA
value.
In the corruption attack, an adversary has acquired from an
external source the SA value xi of some record r in the data.
r is called a corrupted record. Armed with this knowledge, the
adversary will boost the accuracy of inference by excluding
one occurrence of xi when inferring the sensitive value of the
remaining records that share the same bucket with r. To
combat the accuracy boosting, we propose to inject some
small number σ of fake SA values into each bucket g, where
a fake value does not actually belong to any record in the
bucket. To ensure that the adversary cannot distinguish a
fake value from a real value, a fake value must be from the
domain of SA and must be distinct in the bucket. Now, for
each bucket g, the table QIT contains |g| records and the
table ST contains |g| + σ distinct SA values, in a random
order. The adversary knows σ of these SA values are fake
but does not know which ones.
Suppose now that in a corruption attack, the adversary is
able to corrupt q records in a bucket g, where q ≤ |g|, so
|g| − q + σ values remain in g, σ of which are fake. Note
that |g| and σ are constants. Therefore, the more records the
adversary is able to corrupt (i.e., a larger q), the larger the
proportion of fake values among the remaining records in the
bucket (i.e., σ|g|−q+σ ) and the more uncertain the adversary is
about whether a remaining value in g is a real value or a fake
value. Even if all but one record in a bucket are corrupted,
the adversary has only 1/(1 + σ) certainty that a remaining
value is a real value. The price to pay for this additional
protection is the distortion by the σ fake values added to
each bucket.
The study in [13][17] shows that under unusual circum-
stances a negative association between a non-sensitive value
z and a SA value x may be learnt from the published data
T ∗, which states that a record having z is less likely to have
x. Using such negative association, an adversary could ex-
clude unlikely choices x when inferring the sensitive value for
an individual having the non-sensitive value z. Since this
attack shares the same mechanism as the corruption attack,
i.e., by excluding unlikely values, the above solution proposed
for corruption attack can be applied to deter the negative as-
sociation attack, with one difference: a fake value should not
be easily excluded for any record using the negative associa-
tion knowledge. To ensure this, the publisher can first learn
the negative association from T ∗ and inject only those fake
values into a bucket that cannot be removed using the learnt
negative association.
Parameters Settings
Cardinality |T | 100k, 200k, 300k, 400k, 500k
f ′i -privacy for xi f
′
i = min{1, θ × fi + 0.02}
Privacy coefficient θ 2, 4, 8, 16, 32
M mini{d1/f ′ie}
M ′ 50
Table 4: Parameter settings
7. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the algo-
rithms proposed in Section 5. For this purpose, we utilized
the real data set CENSUS containing personal information of
500K American adults. This data set was previously used in
[22], [15] and [19]. Table 5 shows the eight discrete attributes
of the data. Two base tables were generated from CENSUS.
The first table OCC has Occupation as SA and the 7 remain-
ing attributes as the QI-attributes. The second table EDU
has Education as SA and the 7 remaining attributes as the
QI-attributes. OCC-n and EDU-n denote the data sets of
OCC and EDU of the cardinality n. Figure 2 shows the fre-
quency distribution of SA. The parameters and settings are
summarized in Table 4 with the default setting in bold face.
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of SA
We evaluate our algorithms by three criteria: suitability
for handling varied sensitivity, data utility, and scalability.
7.1 Criterion 1: Handling Variable Sensitivity
Our first objective is to study the suitability of F ′-privacy
for handling variable sensitivity and skewed distribution of
sensitive values. For concreteness, we specify F ′-privacy by
f ′i = min{1, θ × fi + 0.02}, where θ is the privacy coefficient
chosen from {2, 4, 8, 16, 32}. This specification models a lin-
ear relationship between the sensitivity f ′i and the frequency
Attribute Domain Size
Age 76
Gender 2
Education 14
Marital 6
Race 9
Work-Class 10
Country 83
Occupation 50
Table 5: Statistics of CENSUS
fi for xi. Since f
′
i ≥ fi for all xi’s, a solution satisfying F ′-
privacy always exists (Lemma 1). In fact, a solution exists
even with the maximum bucket size constraint M ′ = 50.
For comparison purposes, we apply `-diversity to model the
above F ′-privacy, where ` is set to d1/minif ′ie (Remark 1).
For the OCC-300K and EDU-300K data sets, which have the
minimum fi of 0.18% and 0.44%, respectively, Figure 3 plots
the relationship between θ and `. Except for θ = 32, a rather
large ` is required to enforce F ′-privacy. As such, the buckets
produced by Anatomy [22] have a large size ` or `+1, thus, a
large Loss. A large ` also renders `-diversity too restrictive.
As discussed in Remark 1, 1/` ≥ maxifi is necessary for
having a `-diversity solution. With OCC-300K’s maximum
fi being 7.5% and EDU-300K’s maximum being 27.3%, this
condition is violated for all ` ≥ 14 in the case of OCC-300K
and all ` ≥ 4 in the case of EDU-300K, thus, for most F ′-
privacy considered. This study suggests that `-diversity is
not suitable for handling sensitive values of varied sensitivity
and skewed distribution.
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Figure 3: The relationship between ` (y-axis) and
privacy coefficient θ (x-axis)
7.2 Criterion 2: Data Utility
Our second objective is to evaluate the utility of T ∗. We
consider two utility metrics, Mean Squared Error (MSE) (Def-
inition 3) and Relative Error (RE) for count queries previ-
ously used in [22]. We compare TwoSizeBucketing, denoted
by “TwoSize”, and MultiSizeBucketing, denoted by “Multi-
Size”, against two other methods. (i) Optimal multi-size
bucketing, denoted by “Optimal”, is the exact solution to the
optimal multi-size bucket setting problem, solved by an inte-
ger linear program. “Optimal” provides the theoretical lower
bound on Loss, but it is feasible only for a small domain
size |SA|. (ii) Anatomy [22] with `-diversity being set to
` = d1/minif ′ie. Except for “Anatomy”, the minimum bucket
size M is set to min{d1/f ′ie} and the maximum bucket size
M ′ is set to 50.
7.2.1 Mean Squared Error (MSE)
Figure 4 shows MSE vs the privacy coefficient θ on the
default OCC-300K and EDU-300K. The study in Section 7.1
shows that for most F ′-privacy considered the corresponding
`-diversity cannot be achieved on the OCC and EDU data
sets. For comparison purposes, we compute the MSE for
“Anatomy”based on the bucket size of ` or `+1 while ignoring
the privacy constraint. “Anatomy” has a significantly higher
MSE than all other methods across all settings of θ because
the bucket sizes ` and ` + 1 are large. “TwoSize” has only
a slightly higher MSE than “MultiSize”, which has only a
slightly higher MSE than “Optimal”. This study suggests
that the restriction to the two-size bucketing problem causes
only a small loss of optimality and that the heuristic solution
is a good approximation to the optimal solution of the multi-
size bucket setting problem.
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Figure 4: MSE (y-axis) vs privacy coefficient θ (x-
axis)
7.2.2 Relative Error (RE)
We adapt count queries Q of the form from [22]:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T
WHERE pred(A1) AND ... AND pred(Aqd) AND pred(SA)
A1, · · · , Aqd are randomly selected QI-attributes. qd is the
query dimensionality and is randomly selected from {1, · · · , 7}
with equal probability, where 7 is the total number of QI at-
tributes. For any attribute A, pred(A) has the form
A = a1 OR ... OR A = ab,
where ai is a random value from the domain of A. As in
[22], the value of b depends on the expected query selectivity,
which was set to 1% here. The details can be found in [22].
The answer act to Q using T is the number of records in T
that satisfy the condition in the WHERE clause. We created
a pool of 5,000 count queries of the above form. For each
query Q in the pool, we compute the estimated answer est
using T ∗ in the same way as in [22]. The relative error (RE)
on Q is defined to be RE = |act − est|/act. We report the
average RE over all queries in the pool.
Figure 5 shows RE vs the privacy coefficient θ on the de-
fault OCC-300K and EDU-300K. For the OCC data set, the
maximum RE is slightly over 10%. The RE’s for “TwoSize”,
“MultiSize”, and “Optimal” are relatively close to each other,
which is consistent with the earlier finding on similar MSE
for these algorithms. For the EDU data set, all RE’s are
no more than 10%. “MultiSize” improves upon “TwoSize”
by about 2%, and “Optimal” improves upon “MultiSize” by
about 2%. This study suggests that the solutions of the opti-
mal two-size bucketing and the heuristic multi-size bucketing
are highly accurate for answering count queries, with the RE
below 10% for most F ′-privacy considered. “Anatomy” was
not included since there is no corresponding `-diversity solu-
tion for most F ′-privacy considered (see Section 7.1).
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Figure 5: Relative Error (%) (y-axis) vs privacy co-
efficient θ (x-axis)
7.3 Criterion 3: Scalability
Lastly, we evaluate the scalability for handling large data
sets. We focus on TwoSizeBucketing because it is a key com-
ponent of MultiSizeBucketing. “No-pruning” refers to the se-
quential search of the full list Γ without any pruning; “Loss-
pruning” refers to the loss-based pruning in Section 5.1.2;
“Full-pruning” refers to TwoSizeBucketing in Section 5.1.3,
which exploits both loss-based pruning and privacy-based
pruning. “Optimal” refers to the integer linear program solu-
tion to the two-size bucketing problem. We study the Run-
time with respect to the cardinality |T | and the domain size
|SA|. The default privacy coefficient setting θ = 8 is used.
All algorithms were implemented in C++ and run on a Win-
dows 64 bits Platform with CPU of 2.53 GHz and memory
size of 12GB. Each algorithm was run 100 times and the av-
erage time is reported here.
7.3.1 Scalability with |T |
Figure 6 shows Runtime vs the cardinality |T |. “Full-
pruning”takes the least time and“No-pruning”takes the most
time. “Loss-pruning” significantly reduces the time compared
to “No-pruning”, but has an increasing trend in Runtime as
|T | increases because of the sequential search of the first valid
pair in the list Γ′. In contrast, a larger |T | does not affect
“Full-pruning” much because “”Full-pruning” locates the first
valid pair by a binary search over Γ′. “Optimal” takes less
time than “No-pruning” because the domain size |SA| is rela-
tively small. The next experiment shows that the comparison
is reversed for a large domain size |SA|.
7.3.2 Scalability with |SA|
We scale up |SA| for OCC-500K and EDU-500K by a fac-
tor γ, where γ is ranged over 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64. As-
sume that the domain of SA has the form {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1}.
For each record t in T , we replace t[SA] in t with the value
γ × t[SA] + r, where r is an integer selected randomly from
the range [0, γ − 1] with equal probability. Thus the new do-
03
6
9
12
15
100k 200k 300k 400k 500k
Optimal Loss-based
Full-pruning No-pruning
(a) OCC
0
1
2
3
4
100k 200k 300k 400k 500k
Optimal Loss-based
Full-pruning No-pruning
(b) EDU
Figure 6: Runtime (seconds) (y-axis) vs cardinality
|T | (x-axis)
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Figure 7: Runtime (seconds) (y-axis) vs scale-up fac-
tor γ for |SA| (x-axis)
main of SA has the size m× γ. Figure 7 shows Runtime vs
the scale-up factor γ. As γ increases, Runtime of “Optimal”
increases quickly because the integer linear programming is
exponential in the domain size |SA|. Runtime of the other
algorithms increases little because the complexity of these al-
gorithms is linear in the domain size |SA|. Interestingly, as
|SA| increases, Runtime of “No-pruning” decreases. A close
look reveals that when there are more SA values, fi and f
′
i
become smaller and the minimum bucket size M becomes
larger, which leads to a short Γ list. A shorter Γ list benefits
most the sequential search based “No-pruning”.
In summary, we showed that the proposed methods can
better handle sensitive values of varied sensitivity and skewed
distribution, therefore, retain more information in the data,
and the solution is scalable for large data sets.
8. CONCLUSION
Although differential privacy has many nice properties, it
does not address the concern of inferential privacy, which
arises due to the wide use of statistical inferences in advanced
applications. On the other hand, previous approaches to in-
ferential privacy suffered from major limitations, namely, lack
of flexibility in handling varied sensitivity, poor utility, and
vulnerability to auxiliary information. This paper developed
a novel solution to overcome these limitations. Extensive ex-
perimental results confirmed the suitability of the proposed
solution for handling sensitive values of varied sensitivity and
skewed distribution.
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